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Abstract
Gender politics and the public sphere have been two key areas of 
intervention on the part of both the secular Pahlavi monarchy 
of Iran and the religious government under the Islamic regime. 
One of the consequences of Reza Shah’s modernising project, 
which allowed for more open and progressive gender norms and 
gave women access to education, work and other opportunities, 
was the alienation of the vast majority of conservative Iranian 
families who no longer recognised the new secular public sphere 
they found outside their door. Unsurprisingly, while a small 
number of Iranian women managed to benefit from the changes 
that were supposedly enacted for their benefit, for the vast 
majority these reforms were hardly liberating and family life 
remained fairly traditional.
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1 
“To cover” or “to veil” are 
the equivalent of the Farsi 
words poshesh or hijab, 
meaning that the hair and 
body of women should be 
concealed by fabric. Hijab 
from the word hojb means 
“modesty” and “shyness”. 
A bi-hejab woman lacks 
such propriety.
2 
Dabashi, Hamid. Close 
Up: Iranian Cinema, Past, 
Present and Future. New 
York, NY: Verso. 2001. pp. 
251-259. 
Public Sphere in Iran
In the late-nineteenth century, before the Constitutional 
Revolution (1906-1911), in the male-dominated society of Iran, women 
were confined to the home and rarely venturing outside. If a woman 
did need to go outside for a particular reason, she would have to cov-
er herself from head to toe with a heavy veil. Thus, women were es-
sentially prisoners in their own homes, or, in the case of concubines, 
the harem; at the very least, they were under the veil or cloak.1 There 
was no opportunity for women to socialise or gather aside from rare 
occasions when they could meet in mosques, at baths, at times of 
religious mourning, or within their neighbourhoods in the small al-
leys between their houses. It is important to note that this limitation 
for women was based on traditional beliefs among Iranian families 
that encouraged a male-dominated public space, a highly segregated 
space for men and women. 
The homes of Iranian notables reflected the segregation of space with-
in that time period. Their houses were divided into two sections: the 
outer apartments for the master and his man servants and the inner 
apartments for the wives and their maids.2 Men and women enter-
ing the divided space had to notify one another by making some sort 
of noise or sound. For instance, men entering the inner quarter had 
to say loudly ya allah to announce their entry, and, in return, women 
passing through the outer quarter would walk quickly and nervously 
wrapped from head to toe in chadors. As it appears, the division was 
very strict; walls, veils and constantly keeping men and women away 
from each other were daily practices in Iran, in both the public and 
private spheres. This situation continued until the 1906 Constitu-
tional Revolution. With a representative government and educational 
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reform and modernisation chief among the objectives of the constitu-
tionalists, this was a great time for women’s awakening. Indeed, wom-
en’s education was seen as a critical part of reforms that would pave 
the way for the creation and development of a modern Iran.3
A group of educated and enlightened women, including feminist 
activist and journalist Sediqeh Dowlatabadi and Al-Saltaneh (the 
daughter of Naser al-Din Shah of the Qajar Dynasty), played a very 
strong role in this time in terms of the schools and societies they 
founded, the articles that they wrote and the journals they published. 
In such a traditional society, promoting women’s education was not 
an easy task to take on, but despite all the setbacks, the movement 
endured and, around 30 years later, the government finally gave its 
official support to the schools for girls the women founded (Act of 
Unveiling, 1936). The aim of these passionate women was also to make 
cultural and educational material, both from a Western and tradition-
al perspective, accessible to Iranian women. From 1925 onwards, two 
magazines were published, namely Nameye Banevan, Dokhtarane Iran 
and Etelaate Banevan (by Etelaat, one of the great publishing houses).4 
The women who were active in the new political and educational 
realms that were created were the wives, daughters and sisters of male 
politicians, who could support and protect them in their endeavours. 
Thus, the presence, or possible presence, of women in Iran can be 
said to have been started by bourgeois families and was not a grass-
roots movement. These elite or upper-class families had the means 
to travel abroad and have their daughters, sisters and wives educat-
ed there. The progress they made during 1907-1926 was later built 
on by a larger network of middle-class women that attended their 
gatherings, classes and events. By the mid-twentieth century, wom-
en from different social classes and ethnic groups had become part 
of the movement’s activities and the male-dominated society slowly 
opened to women, culturally, politically and socially. 
It is important to note that this was the time that also marked the birth 
of secularisation (1924-1941) in Iranian history. Secularism in Iran was 
established as state policy shortly after Reza Shah was crowned king in 
1924. He was very much against any kind of traditional or religious 
ceremony or public gathering. For instance, he banned any public 
3 
Badr ol-Molul Bamdad 
et al. From Darkness into 
Light: Women’s Emancipa-
tion in Iran. ed. and trans. 
F.R. Bagley. Irvine, ca: 
Mazda Publishers. 1980. 
p. viii.
4 
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London: I.B. Tauris. 2001. 
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display or expression of religious faith, including the wearing of the 
headscarf (hijab or chador) by women. The Islamic clergy were forbid-
den to preach in public, and mosque activities were heavily restricted 
and regulated. Badr-el-Molok Bamdad calls the first Pahlavi monarch 
“the Daybreak” and points to the “momentous decree” delivered by the 
Shah on January 7, 1936 that banned the veil in public. On this day, 
Reza Shah attended a graduation ceremony at the University of Tehran 
and gave a powerful speech in support of women generally.5 In it, he 
encouraged women to be more active in society, considering them to 
be valued members, in particular stating that he wanted to see more 
women being educated. He believed that, since women made up half 
of the Iranian population, their education would not only benefit them 
but also society as a whole.6 He set out a vision for the future in which 
women were as active and powerful as men, giving them a higher status 
than they had ever enjoyed before. At this point, it seemed that Iranian 
women would emerge out of a situation where they had been kept in 
ignorance to one where they would become enlightened. In fact, fol-
lowing the ceremony, Reza Shah actually changed the rules regarding 
women’s attire in public, imposing a Western-style dress code of skirt 
and blouse while banning the veil or, indeed, any type of hijab. 
This act can be seen as a kind of widening of the boundaries of the 
domestic to the public. One of Reza Shah’s aims in passing the Un-
veiling Act was, in fact, to democratise gender roles, in imitation of 
the Western model, by unveiling women and encouraging mixed social 
gatherings. Prior to this decision, the space outside the home was a 
male-dominated area; only a very limited number of women were to 
be found in places such as cafes, workplaces, educational settings and 
shops. The Act of Unveiling thus forced women to become active par-
ticipants in life outside the home. In this way, women gradually became 
more independent and participated alongside men in society, meaning 
that society became a more balanced and mixed-gender environment. 
At the same time, following Reza Shah’s decree, any woman found 
covered in public was to be forcibly uncovered. One must remember 
that for many years previously women had been covered, and this sud-
den change was unsurprisingly perceived by some as an act of violence 
against women. Indeed, feminists like Badr-el-Molok Bamdad noted 
the verbal and physical harassment that veiled women were subjected 
5 
Badr ol-Molul Bamdad, 
op. cit., pp. 7-23.
6 
This speech more or less 
echoed what Taj al-Sultan 
had said in 1906. See 
Abbas, Amanat (ed.). 
Taj Al-Saltana: Crowning 
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to as Reza Shah’s soldiers forcibly unveiled them. As a result, the Un-
veiling Act ultimately ensured that women who had spent their entire 
lives wearing the veil would, in fact, remain in the private confines of 
their homes since, for them, walking the street unveiled was tanta-
mount to walking the street naked.7 They perceived the “new” street as 
a dangerous and disconnected space (namahram) and, in order to main-
tain their safety and modesty, chose to stay away from this domain. 
Thus, after this seminal day in Iranian history, women became policed 
by men, and their bodies became a site of enforcement. This situation 
is very similar to the situation that exists in Iran today, except that 
now, as a result of Khomeini’s decree, women must cover themselves. 
This was the point at which he consolidated his power and effectively 
turned Iran into an Islamic state. Whoever is in power, it seems that a 
woman’s body is perpetually a site of state control.
Despite the level of violence and aggression surrounding the Act of 
Unveiling, the dominant feminist response at the time was celebrato-
ry. It was seen as such an important milestone that Reza Shah made 
7 January “National Women’s Day”, replacing International Women’s 
Day on 8 March. In essence, Reza Shah was modernising the country 
by destroying the boundaries between the andaroni (the private and 
inner domain) and the bironi (the public and outer domain). It can be 
said that, in a way, the official bourgeois public sphere was an insti-
tutional vehicle for major historical transformation in the context of 
political domination.8
Slowly but surely, progress was made in terms of women’s rights and 
status in Iran; however, this progress was not consistent. For instance, 
while women readily had access to birth control pills and abortions, 
to travel abroad they still needed written permission from their hus-
bands.9 Reza Shah, and later Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, essentially 
pushed through quick dramatic changes without any real platform that 
would allow women to negotiate their life outside of the home. On the 
surface, these changes might appear progressive, but the core structure 
was not stable and much was still needed to be done for women’s rights. 
Under the iron rule of Reza Shah, the judiciary was secularised in 1931, 
but family law was left to the jurisdiction of the clergy and the dictate 
of Sharia law. This said, one great achievement during Reza Shah’s son’s 
subsequent reign was the passing of the Family Protection Law in 1967, 
7 
Badr ol-Molul Bamdad, 
op. cit., pp. 7-23.
8 
Fraser, Nancy. “Rethink-
ing the Public Sphere: A 
Contribution to the Cri-
tique of Actually Existing 
Democracy”. Social Text. 
Nos. 25/26. 1990. p. 62.
9 
Daragahi, Haideh and 
Witoszek, Nina. “Anti-to-
talitarian Feminism? Civic 
Resistance in Iran”. In L. 
Trägårdh, N. Witoszek 
and B. Taylor B. (eds.). 
Civil Society in the Age 
of Monitory Democracy. 
Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
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which set up special courts to deal with family law matters and put 
useful safeguards in place with regard to the minimum marriageable 
age, divorce and child custody.10 On the other hand, it was during Reza 
Shah’s reign that the first instances of Islamic extremism also appeared 
in Iran as a backlash against his secularist policies.
Government and Public Life
In 1941, Reza Shah was dismissed from his position and a new 
era in the Iranian secularist movement began. His son, Mohammad 
Reza Shah took power and made outstanding changes to the restric-
tions in place from the time of his father’s rule. From 1941 until 1953, 
a form of democracy was restored to Iran that improved relations 
with the religious clergy and softened the rules for women’s dress. 
This did not last long, however, as Mohammad Reza Shah gradually 
started to increase the level of regulation again. After 1953, the Irani-
an government became less democratic but increasingly secularised. 
In that context, it began to reduce the influence of the Shi’a clergy 
and organised religion in government and public life.
One of the most controversial actions by Mohammad Reza Shah was 
in the late 1960s, when he forced the Shi’a clerical novitiates to attend 
public state-run universities in order to gain religious certification and 
license to preach, similar to the requirements on Christian schools of 
theology. The imposition of this new requirement was seen as extreme 
action towards religious members of Iran. In response to these devel-
opments, Islam really started to become a powerful force in Iranian 
politics in the 1960s. During this time, Shi’ite fundamentalists started 
to become more active, encouraging students to stand up and fight 
against the modernisation of society (and, in turn, against the Pahlavi 
monarchy). This movement was started by Ayatollahs Najafabadi and 
Khomeini. Their aim was to halt modernisation and establish an Is-
lamic idealist culture. Eventually, the Islamic Shi’ite fundamentalist 
movement succeeded in initiating the 1979 Revolution and they have 
governed the country ever since. There was a short break of eight 
years during Mohammad Khatami’s reformist presidency (1997-2005), 
but apart from this fairly brief period, since 1979, Iran has been ruled 
10 
Ibid.
11 
Based on The Origins of 
Totalitarianism by Hannah 
Arendt, a total theocratic 
control of all aspects of 
individual existence is being 
referred to as totalitarian-
ism. The Islamic Republic of 
Khomeini in post-revolution-
ary Iran did not leave any 
area of life—political, social, 
private, public or other-
wise—to the discretion of 
its citizens. The comparison 
is made in this context, but 
the author is aware that 
Arendt’s description of 
Hitler’s state as totalitarian 
is a contested matter and 
that it is more likely based 
on Gleichschaltung (the pro-
cess of Nazification); thus, 
any comparison between 
the Nazi regime and Islamic 
Republic might be somewhat 
controversial. 
12 
Motahhari, Morteza. The 
Problem of Hijab, Tehran: Ba-
sir Publication. 1986.  p. 29.
13 
At the same time, there 
were many other changes to 
women’s lives in Iran. Most 
notably, sweeping reforms 
to family law saw the legal 
age for marriage for girls 
lowered from 18 to just 9; 
this shocking reform was 
perceived as opening the 
way to legalised child abuse. 
The number of women in 
the workplace also fell 
dramatically within three 
years. Between 1979 and 
1981, women who did go to 
work (where they were kept 
separate from men) were 
checked at the gates of their 
workplace to make sure 
they were properly veiled 
and not wearing make-up. 
A de facto gender apartheid 
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by Islamic fundamentalist Shi’ism. While Reza Shah and his son had 
established a dictatorship prior to the dominance of Islam, a form of 
totalitarianism was at the heart of the Islamic Republic.11 
In 1979, after the deposition of the government of Prime Minister 
Shahpor Bakhtiar in February, an interim government was estab-
lished headed by Mehdi Bazargan, but just a few months later, in 
November that year, most of that government resigned en masse after 
the US Embassy takeover by a group of radical students (the Iran 
hostage crisis). It is important to note that the end of Bazargan’s 
government officially marked the end of state-directed secularism in 
Iran. By February 1980, the Islamic Republican Party of Iran was of-
ficially in power, with Ayatollah Khomeini as its supreme leader. In-
evitably, any secular opposition to the new Islamist government was 
supressed and dismantled. In fact, it took no more than four years for 
all secularist activity to be eradicated (by 1984). The people behind 
this secularist activity were branded “heretics” and “apostates” by 
the clerical hierarchy, and eventually jailed, executed or exiled. The 
Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 called for the foundation of an Is-
lamic state based on Islamic principles and the upholding of Islamic 
law. Islamic fundamentalists believe that women should cover them-
selves in order to prevent sexual tension in society, because men are 
not capable of controlling their sexual desire.12 They, therefore, im-
posed the veiling of women as a visible symbol of that commitment.13 
As previously mentioned, the compulsory wearing of the veil to hide 
the hair and body of women has been introduced and repealed many 
times throughout Iran’s history, beginning with Reza Shah’s 1936 ban 
on the headscarf and chador as part of his Westernising and secularising 
project.14 This position is, of course, in stark contrast to what occurred 
some 40 years later when, following the 1979 Revolution, Ruhollah 
Khomeini reversed this decision and decreed that women should now 
cover their heads. Wrapped in a black chador, these women became 
icons of the Islamic Revolution and, two decades later, their more re-
laxed, colourful and vibrant hijabs became the symbol of a new era of 
progress and reform in the Islamic Republic. The restriction on cloth-
ing for women in Iran is based on governmental “authoritative poli-
tics”, which turns fashion into a political statement.15 Attention may be 
drawn to The Origins of Totalitarianism by Hannah Arendt, a work which 
segregating men and women 
was also established in the 
streets, extending to public 
transport, cinemas, queues, 
and so on. Film and tv 
were heavily censored, with 
unveiled female actresses 
having to be blacked out. 
The morality police could 
forcefully break into private 
parties at any time to check 
who was present and what 
was going on, and no sociali-
sation was allowed between 
unrelated men and women. 
Primitive laws, including 
flogging and stoning, were 
also passed, in response 
to the re-actualisation of 
the concept of “an eye for 
an eye”. National Women’s 
Day was set as 12 June, the 
birthday of Fatimah, the 
daughter of the Prophet 
Muhammad. Gradually, the 
Islamic government also 
started to demolish local 
cultural centres (marakeze 
refahe khanevade) where 
women would meet to learn 
about childcare, housework 
and other pursuits. Due to 
the disappearance of these 
places, the National Unity of 
Women’s Associations decid-
ed to run private sessions in 
Tehran and beyond, to keep 
trying to educate women 
and pass on the most up-to-
date information available, 
away from the control and 
interference of the Islamists.
14 
Razi, A. Complete History of 
Iran (Tarih‐I-Mofassal‐I-Iran). 
Tehran: Eghbal and Shora-
kae Publication. 1956. pp. 
659‐664.
15 
Craik, Jennifer. Fashion: The 
Key Concepts. Oxford: Berg. 
2009. p. 42.
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looks at Gleichschaltung (the process of Nazification) in Germany.16 
With its total theocratic control of all aspects of individual existence, 
Khomeini’s state had a similar approach to Hitler’s state as described 
by Arendt, although it was not, of course, the same. In other words, the 
Islamic Republic (Khomeini) did not leave any area of life—political, 
social, private, public or otherwise—to the discretion of its citizens.
One hypothesis is that the Islamic Republic’s humiliation and suppres-
sion of women in Iran is a policy designed to control society as a whole. 
As such, the Iranian women’s movement should be viewed as a form of 
civil resistance, with implications far beyond the national boundaries of 
Iran itself. If this holds, the Iranian women’s movement is thus an an-
ti-totalitarian movement. Upon close examination, it appears that the 
focus of the feminist movement in Iran has always been about reclaim-
ing human dignity for all people. While Swedish and Dutch feminists, 
for instance, ask for more and better childcare facilities for their chil-
dren so that they can go out to work, and gain more leadership positions 
for women in industry, Iranian feminists, in contrast, are still struggling 
to achieve basic human rights in their own country.17 It is instructive to 
note that women were the first to notice the totalitarian threat of the 
Islamic government, a fact that was expressed clearly and unambigu-
ously on 8 March 1979. As already noted, the emphasis of the feminist 
movement in Iran is on human dignity, and opposition to theocratic 
power. Such a movement transcends cultural and gender boundaries, 
which is why both men and women, and people from other countries 
and cultures, were so keen to become involved and show their support.
The new veil worn following the Revolution soon came to represent 
the “state”. It was no longer simply an expression of religious belief 
and, as such, it was seen in a different way to the traditional cover-
ing. Before 1979, women who had worn a veil had done so of their 
own volition, since, at that time, what women wore was a matter of 
personal choice and was not stipulated by law. In other words, wom-
en could choose what they wore as long as they respected certain 
broad conventions, for instance, with regard to what type of clothing 
deemed suitable for their social class. However, after the Revolution, 
women who had previously chosen not to wear the veil were sudden-
ly branded “infidels” (bad hijab).18 Veiling soon became indissociable 
from a wider Muslim identity and the veiled Iranian woman’s own 
religious belief became subsumed to her status as an Islamic icon.
16 
Arendt, Hannah. On Rev-
olution, London: Penguin 
Books. 1963.
17 
Daragahi and Witoszek, 
op. cit., pp. 231-254.  
18 
Amir-Ebrahimi, op. cit., 
p. 92.  
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On the other hand, the veil is now perceived by women as more than 
just an instrument of segregation as it has come to facilitate their 
access to the public arena and given them a means to renegotiate 
boundaries. Veiling has been particularly useful for traditional wom-
en who now actively participate in public spaces and institutions 
they did not have access to before.19 This has deeply changed the 
existing class hierarchy, since, historically, within the Iranian con-
text, public inaccessibility was an indicator of both male and female 
high social status (“conventional notions of public and private [were] 
not congruent with gender”; rather, they were related to the social 
class of the individual).20 Similarly, Asma Afsaruddin reflects on the 
dichotomy of private/public and questions the misconception that 
power is equated with visibility by citing examples of upper-class 
women’s seclusion from public space contrary to lower-class women’s 
participation in it as a result of the “new” compulsory dress code.21 
Thus, the enforcement of the dress code in Iranian society since 1979 
has, in fact, been an empowering tool for traditional women.
Arshin Adib-Moghaddam refers to Islam as a via media between the 
authoritarian status quo in Iran (and the Arab world) and a liberal or-
der that would ensure democracy, freedom of belief and religion and 
ultimately a liberated society. Adib-Moghaddam continues that in 
“all theories of Islam, freedom comes first and religious ordinances are 
relegated to individual choice.” The question that arises here is, how 
could Islam be secular or, indeed, how could freedom be interpreted 
under Islamic fundamentalist beliefs? There is a constant underlying 
notion of superiority within the Islamic belief system that does not 
let the existence of democratic form evolve. Adib-Moghaddam notes 
that “at base, secular Islam remains an ‘identitarian’ project that does 
not sufficiently connect the Muslim ‘self ’ to the rest of humanity.” 
Other religions such as “Bahais, Christians, Jews, Heathens, Hindus, 
Buddhists, Zoroastrians, etc. continue to linger on the side roads of 
the Islamic highway.” Thus, there is not much space for “free” choice 
within the Islamic hermeneutic structure.22
If Islamic secularists exist in any form in Muslim society, they “share 
with their ideological, Islamist counterparts the conviction of supe-
riority despite the nascent philosophical and critical content of their 
ideas.” They strongly stand for this united view point that “Muslims 
19 
The unifying theme of 
the papers contained in 
this volume is women’s 
traversal of public space 
and the process of nego-
tiation of their gendered 
identities that this entails. 
Many of the papers detail 
women’s exploration 
of avenues that enable 
self-empowerment. The 
notion of empowerment 
here connotes the idea 
of the carving out of 
public space by women for 
themselves, sometimes 
paradoxically by not even 
leaving the home; they are 
able to benefit from this 
and impose their presence 
on society as a whole. 
20 
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ereignty in the Ottoman 
Empire. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 1993. 
p. 45.
21 
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ate Societies. Cambridge, 
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hold the holy grail of truth and that they are obliged to invite and 
persuade others to understand it.” Thus, Islam, even in its provisional 
liberal garb, could be contaminated by different forms of hegemony. 
Therefore, within Islamic fundamentalist culture, convincing others 
to follow Islam, enforcing a dress code and killing infidels is all seen 
as “civilising society” and not as war or aggression.23 
Metaphorical Public Space in Iran
The restrictions on clothing for women in Iran are based on 
governmental “authoritative politics”, which turns fashion into a 
political statement.24 Frantz Fanon notes that one of the most sig-
nificant elements of Muslim society is the Act of Veiling for wom-
en.25 Visitors to a Muslim country may not necessarily be aware that 
Muslims do not consume pork, or that Muslims avoid sexual relations 
during Ramadan, but, for the majority, it is the veiling of women that 
represents and symbolises Islamic culture.26 Veiling, therefore, is a 
clear and distinctive political statement in Muslim society. We can 
argue here that women of today in Iran are appropriating the most 
visible political statement at their disposal, i.e. clothing, in order to 
express their resistance against the conditions imposed on them. Over 
the past 80 years, the condition of unveiling (1936) or veiling (1979) 
has been violently imposed on women in Iran by political/religious 
powers. Even when away from such powers, the manners, behaviours 
and views attached to years of wearing or not wearing the covering 
cannot be done away with so easily, and certainly not overnight.
The hijab I iffat (hijabisation of behaviour) is another form of veiling 
that exists within Iranian society. The hijab I iffat is not a piece of cloth 
external to the female body, but rather “an invisible form of veil to be 
acquired through modern education, as some internal quality of self, 
a new modern self, a disciplined modern body that obscured wom-
en’s sexuality, obliterated its bodily presence.” Therefore, it seems as 
though, aside from the physical veil, there is also an invisible/meta-
phorical veil for both men and women in Iran, between what is and 
what could be seen, heard or experienced. The values that keep this 
invisible veil in place were established by the Islamic religion long 
22 
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ago, and have been protected and passed down between families (tra-
dition) and societies (authoritative power). The strength of these val-
ues differs between families and is dependent mostly on social class, 
but for the majority of modest Muslim Iranians it is customary to be 
surrounded by walls and veils. An Iranian woman is expected to be 
constantly aware of and respect her boundaries and to keep herself 
protected by the interior walls of her home or by the fabric walls of her 
veil or covering. Farzaneh Milani notes, “[w]omen have been veiled 
and unveiled by force but they will remain enfolded and covered by 
physical and psychological traces of their modes of acceptance or re-
jection of the veil.”27 This description of women responding to veiling 
in its physical and metaphorical forms raises a very contemporary 
concern about veiling. I myself can very much relate to this quote, in 
that I live in a comparatively free society in the UK and yet struggle to 
unfold layers of immaterial veil that cloak my every behaviour.
Language and Architecture
It can be said that veiling is perhaps one of the most sym-
bolically significant structures of a complex cultural heritage that 
expresses, among other things, Iran’s prevailing attitude toward the 
self and other. Veiling and unveiling have had much more of an im-
pact on Iranian society than simply covering and uncovering women. 
For instance, in architecture and urban planning, the need to keep 
the genders away from each other has necessitated particular re-ar-
rangements, notes Professor Fataneh Farahani. In this regard, the 
basic architecture of the city of Tehran could be viewed as providing 
a glimpse into Iranian veiling culture, with Farahani stating that “the 
normative regulations of veiling, similar to other social, cultural and 
political characteristics, are embedded in architecture conventions as 
well as in aesthetic features.” For example, windows in houses must be 
above 170cm from the ground to prevent passers-by from looking in, 
i.e. the stipulation provides a form of protection and privacy for the 
people living inside the house. There are, of course, many situations 
where the sexes are segregated, with women typically being expected 
to sit at the back of the classroom and bus (as well as other modes of 
transport) and behind men in the mosque, as well as walking close 
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to the wall.28 At the same time, veiling is also visible in the language 
used in post-revolutionary Iran. Various words have been replaced in 
favour of a more shielded/guarded and covered form of expression 
that has become common in both written and verbal communica-
tion. For example, pestan (breast) is now sineh (chest), pestan-band (bra 
or, literally, breast holder) is now sineh-band (chest holder) and kun has 
become a more innocuous version of basan meaning bottom. 
In recent years, there has been a major shift in the way the veil is per-
ceived by women. In post-revolutionary Iran, women are allowed to 
appear in the public realm so long as they are separated from it by their 
veil (shield).29 No longer solely an instrument of their segregation, the 
veil has, therefore, come to facilitate women’s access to the public are-
na and given them a means to renegotiate boundaries. The tradition-
al equation of veiled = absent is no longer as clear or immutable as it 
once was, because a woman can now be veiled and also have a public 
voice and presence at the same time, meaning that the situation today 
is double-edged.30 There is no state of full or absolute “veiled-ness” or 
“unveiled-ness”; whether veiled or unveiled, there is a constant duality. 
The protection zones and boundaries created by veils and walls sug-
gest a general lack of trust among Iranian men. The veil or wall ex-
presses their “possession” of a particular female body, and, as such, 
their masculinity drives them to protect or hide it from other men.31 
“Insiders” and “outsiders” are categorised as mahram and namahram 
respectively. This means that fathers, brothers, husbands and un-
cles are allowed to see the woman without her veil, but others are 
not. However, these traditional beliefs are no longer held by a new 
generation, and many youngsters have found a way to transgress all 
these barriers, albeit strictly underground. It is important to note 
that this observation is set within an urban middle-class vision and 
might differ between the social classes to a certain degree. My visit 
to Tehran in 2015 differed greatly from the picture I had in my mind 
of my previous visits in 2012, 2013 and 2014. I encountered open and 
relaxed male/female relationships being conducted behind closed 
doors in homes and in private companies (as opposed to state-owned 
companies). Parties in the lobbies of modern apartment blocks in 
West/North Tehran are now attended by men and women alike, who 
will dress up for the occasion. Comparisons can be made to London’s 
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Soho on a Saturday night, the only difference being that in Tehran, 
these parties take place clandestinely, out of sight of the moral police. 
When inside people’s homes I was reminded of the London lifestyle, 
but its Islamic counterpart does continue to prevail on the streets of 
Tehran. Each time I visit my home town I seem to encounter more 
and more conflicting and bizarre combinations of fashion, trends 
and lifestyles.
Public space in post-revolutionary Iran does not only encompass 
physical space; virtual space and blogs are also important liberal plat-
forms for public expression. Masserat Amir-Ebrahimi, a noted Iranian 
feminist and sociologist, remarks, “[i]n the past two decades, gradual 
transgressions of Urf 32 and Shari’a have become a sign of moderni-
ty and resistance for many women and young people who wish to 
generate changes in their situation.”33 She further explains that, “If 
‘improperly veiled’ women in urban public spaces are considered a 
challenge to Shari’a and the rules of public conduct in the Islamic Re-
public, the acts of self-narration and self-disclosure in ‘Weblogistan’ 
are considered a transgression of Urf and the rules of patriarchy.”34 
Transgressing Urf, a common practice among urban middle-class 
women and youths in Iran, refers to resisting the Islamisation of 
society. The English sociologist Chris Jenks defines transgression as 
“that conduct which breaks rules or exceeds boundaries”.35 As such, 
he considers it an indicator of modernity: “A feature of modernity, 
accelerating into postmodernity, is the desire to transcend—limits 
that are physical, racial, aesthetic, sexual, national, legal and moral… 
Modernity has unintentionally generated an ungoverned desire to 
extend, exceed, or go beyond the margins of acceptability or normal 
performance.”36 Even though women are fighting on this common 
and shared web platform, the movement is largely based upon indi-
vidual acts of pushing these boundaries and restrictions. 
The women of today’s Iran publicly express their resistance in the 
form of an aesthetic rather than actual protest, appropriating the ob-
ject of oppression and turning it into an object of aesthetic pleasure. 
It is interesting to note that the hijab, which is the primary signifier 
of the Muslim faith in the field of visibilities, has now been turned 
into an “accessory”, that is, something that can be added to and com-
plements an outfit.  
